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The international relations of ethnic conflict have been the object of
increased attention over the past ten years, responding to the subject’s
higher profile after the end of the Cold War.1 In a recent issue of CJPS,
Louis Bélanger, Érick Duchesne and Jonathan Paquin ~2005! examine
the conditions under which governments give assistance to secessionist
movements in other countries. They challenge what they define the old
and new conventional wisdoms, respectively vulnerability and ethnic ties,
finding that regime type matters far more. They assert that democracies
are less likely to support secessionist movements in other democracies,
given the norms that govern self-determination in such countries. The
authors advance the debate in the field as they raise important issues
about the role of democracy beyond the democratic peace and engage in
dyadic analyses, developing a series of thoughtful tests of the various
claims. However, their methodology, particularly their coding of ethnic
affinity, produces problematic results. In this response, I discuss their
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article, briefly identify some key difficulties and then present a series of
analyses that suggest that ethnic ties, properly operationalized, and not
democracy, are strongly related to the behaviour of countries towards
secessionist movements and to mobilized ethnic groups in general.
Understanding Intervention and Secession
Bélanger and his co-authors correctly identify the conventional wisdom
concerning which states are likely to support secession. The vulnerabil-
ity argument ~Herbst, 1989; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Touval, 1972!
asserts that states facing their own secessionist challenges are unlikely
to give assistance to separatist movements elsewhere for fear of either
direct retaliation or undermining the international regime prohibiting such
support. Bélanger, Duchesne and Paquin ~BDP! indicate that this regime
weakened in the aftermath of the Cold War ~2005: 437!. Case studies
indicate that this vulnerability was not such a strong deterrent even before
the Soviet Union collapsed ~Heraclides, 1991; Saideman, 1997, 2001a!.
In their article, BDP support the previous quantitative work ~Saideman,
2001a, 2002! showing that vulnerability does not inhibit support for
separatism.
The alternative argument of ethnic ties, termed the new conven-
tional wisdom by BDP, asserts that leaders care more about their own
positions than their countries’ stability ~Saideman, 2001a!. Instead of fear-
ing dangerous precedents, elites care about getting into and remaining in
office. In reacting to ethnic conflicts elsewhere, they consider what their
constituents want, and the primary cue they use to determine such pref-
erences is their ethnic composition. As a result, elites are likely to sup-
port that side of a conflict with which their constituents share ethnic ties.2
Thus, politicians will seek foreign policies that assist the secessionists if
their supporters have ties to them, but the foreign policy will be aimed at
assisting the host governments who are seeking to protect their territo-
rial integrity if the relevant constituents have ties to the people govern-
ing the host. Further, if a politician relies on constituents who have ties
to both sides, then he or she faces a very difficult situation, as support-
ing either side will be politically harmful. In such circumstances, there
are two likely possibilities: supporting both sides or assisting neither.
BDP only focus on the first part of the ethnic ties arguments, about
affinity with the secessionist group, ignoring the two other kinds of
ties—to the state or to both sides. Thus, it should not be surprising that
they find in their analyses that ethnic affinity does not seem to matter.
By their operationalization, we should expect Pakistan, a predominantly
Muslim country, to support the Issaqs, who are Muslim, even if they are
separating from an Islamic country, such as Somalia, whereas the logic
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of ethnic ties espoused above would predict Pakistan and other Islamic
countries to largely stay out of the dispute. Thus, the main contention in
this response is that BDP get different results because they do not cor-
rectly operationalize ethnic ties, but their analyses also suffer from some
other significant problems as well.
Before moving on to the analyses, I should consider the role of
democracy that BDP see as central to the international relations of eth-
nic conflict. To be clear, BDP view democracies as less likely to inter-
vene in the secessionist conflicts of other democracies, as minorities can
exercise their right to self-determination via democratic processes rather
than through secession. Yet there is nothing in their logic limiting the
shield of democracy from blocking intervention by democratic outsiders
towards non-secessionist ethnic conflict as well. That is, democracy should
not only be viewed as reducing the legitimacy and appeal of secession-
ists to outsiders but also that of ethnic dissidents with other goals, such
as changing the government. BDP focus exclusively on secessionist minor-
ities, but as an additional test of their argument and mine, below, I extend
the universe of cases to include all ethnic groups. After all, theories that
account for more behaviour are generally viewed as superior those with
narrower scopes. Indeed, in some of my earlier work ~Saideman, 2001a,
2002!, I found that groups in democracies received less external assis-
tance, although democratic countries were no more or less restrained,
but these were not dyadic analyses, so BDP’s effort to move the field
towards dyadic analyses, where we can test the relationships in play, is
an important contribution.
Abstract. This article is a response to one published by Louis Bélanger, Érick Duchesne and
Jonathan Paquin challenging existing accounts for the patterns of external support for seces-
sionist movements. They assert that regime type—democracy—provides a better explanation
than either vulnerability or ethnic ties. I take issue with their operationalization of my argu-
ments along with other aspects of their work. Here, I replicate their study first using their data
and importing my variable measuring not just ethnic affinity with the secessionists but the pos-
sibilities of a country having ties with either or both sides of an ethnic conflict. Then, using my
data, I again replicate their analyses. I find that ethnic ties, properly measured, not only better
accounts for the international relations of secession but of ethnic conflict in general.
Résumé. Ce texte est une réplique à l’article de Louis Bélanger, Érick Duchesne et Jonathan
Paquin, qui conteste les explications usuelles des variations dans l’appui international aux mou-
vements sécessionnistes. Selon eux, plus que la vulnérabilité ou les liens ethniques, c’est le
type de régime – soit la démocratie – qui explique mieux le phénomène. Je remets en question
leur façon d’opérationnaliser mes arguments, ainsi que plusieurs autres aspects de leur recherche.
Afin de tester leurs résultats, je reproduis d’abord leur étude en utilisant leurs données et en y
ajoutant ma variable qui mesure non seulement les affinités ethniques avec les sécessionnistes,
mais également l’éventualité qu’un pays entretienne des relations avec l’un ou l’autre des pro-
tagonistes d’un conflit ethnique. Puis, je reprends leur analyse en utilisant mes propres don-
nées. Il en ressort que, lorsqu’elle est mesurée correctement, la variable des liens ethniques
fournit une meilleure compréhension non seulement des relations internationales du phénomène
de sécession, mais également des conflits ethniques en général.
A Problematic Challenge
Bélanger, Duchesne and Paquin claim that their analyses are a better
test of the international relations of secession by focusing solely on seces-
sionist conflicts. They imply ~2005: 437! that their results are different
than mine ~2001a, 2002! because of this restriction in the dataset as I
considered all ethnic groups in the minorities at risk dataset ~MAR!.3
Consequently, I run several sets of analyses, using first their dataset
with addition of a better measure of ethnic ties. Then I do several analy-
ses with a dataset that I developed, using first the BDP groups, then a
different specification of secessionist groups and finally all groups in
the MAR dataset. Of course, this discussion raises a significant ques-
tion: why would an approach that covers a narrower set of cases be seen
as superior than a theory that covers a broader set of cases? While it
may be important that the international relations of one kind of ethnic
conflict may be distinct than that of another kind, if, in the end, there
is a logic that covers a variety of forms of ethnic conflict, then should
we not be focused on the one that explains more, rather than less,
behaviour?
BDP, like me, develop two dependent variables—the existence of
external support and the level of support—building from the MAR data-
set and its code sheets. Their levels variable is similar but not identical
to my intensity variable ~2002: 34!, as they take MAR’s coding and
use it as if it were an ordinal ranking. This is quite problematic as
this was not the intention behind MAR, and a close look at the
ranking makes it difficult to determine why active combat units, for
instance, might be considered at a lesser level than cross-border raids,
and, more obviously, why it might be less than “diffuse support.” There-
fore, for the analyses below, I stick with the intensity measure used in
previous work rather than BDP’s as the MAR categories can be
re-organized into increasing levels of significance, risk and probable effi-
cacy as well.
For both their criteria for case selection of secessionist movements
and for their measurement of vulnerability, BDP use MAR’s measure of
autonomy grievances, particularly whether a group aspires for indepen-
dence. While this is not a poor measure, there is a better one for the
logics they are trying to test, one that measures not whether members of
a group consider a particular grievance to be important but whether the
group is actively engaged in separatism. While the two measures are cor-
related, the separatism index used here is more inclusive, so we have
more than ninety cases of separatist groups.4 While BDP might find the
inclusiveness here to be responsible for the different results, I include a
set of analyses that follows their more restricted definition of which obser-
vations should be in these kinds of analyses.
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BDP include a few control variables that I omitted before and will
do so again here. They include a measure of co-operation and conflict,
based on the Kansas event dataset, for instance. However, since the rela-
tionship between two countries may, in part, be related to whether one
supports ethnic groups in the other, including this variable is likely to
raise questions of endogeneity. Is this independent variable affecting the
dependent variable or vice versa? While BDP find the variable to be sig-
nificant, I omit it in the later analyses.5 I drop alliances as well, which
they find to be insignificant, for the same reason that the ethnic politics
in play may be shaping the larger strategic relationship. Instead of alli-
ance, relative power is included here to address realist arguments.6
BDP use logit for their analyses of occurrence and ordinary least
squares regressions for their analyses of levels of support. Given the prob-
lems with their levels indicator and its replacement with an ordinal vari-
able, ordered logit is more appropriate ~the results below do not change
very much if we do use OLS although interpreting the findings does
change!.
Re-Analyzing the International Relations of Secession
BDP’s dyadic approach is adopted here so the observations are of eth-
nic groups and their politically relevant dyads: neighbouring states and
great powers are the possible potential supporters. I use joint democ-
racy and autocratic7 dyads as two independent variables, following BDP.
My variable for vulnerability is different as I use active separatism to
code whether a potential supporter is vulnerable to secession, rather than
TABLE 1
Levels of Support: Coded by Increasing Intensity
Value MAPS Label Minorities at Risk Labels
0 None No support received
1 Low Ideological encouragement ~1!, diffuse support ~14!,* other
unspecified support
2 Moderate Non-military financial support ~2!, access to external
communications ~3!, markets, transport
3 Strong Funds for military supplies ~4!, provision of military equipment
and supplies ~7!, military training in exile ~6!, advisory military
personnel ~8!, peace-keeping observers ~9!
4 Intense Blockades ~10!, cross-border sanctuaries ~5!, rescue missions in
country ~11!, cross-border raids ~13!, active combat units in
country ~12!
* Diffuse support is a rather open category, referring to relatively weak forms of support.
~ ! Indicates level as coded on BDP.
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the grievances variable BDP adopt.8 I include a similar measure for con-
tiguity, border countries and those divided by less than 150 miles of
water. I also add a new control variable to capture the impact of power,
the relative power of the external actor compared to that of the host
government. The original intent behind the coding of this variable was
to test offensive versus defensive variants of realism, as it may be the
case that stronger states use ethnic divisions to undermine weaker states,
as India did to Pakistan in 1970–1971. On the other hand, weaker states
may consider minorities in stronger states to be potential allies as they
seek to balance against stronger states, as Pakistan continues to support
groups in India.
In the analyses of my dataset below, the focus is on 1994–1995, rather
than 1990–1992 in the BDP dataset. The choice is based on both practi-
cal and methodological grounds. First, to be honest, I had already coded
1994–1995, and coding ethnic ties, in particular, is a labour-intensive
task. Second, as BDP point out, the world was still adjusting to the shocks
of Soviet and Yugoslav collapses in 1990–1992, whereas expectations
started to solidify by 1994–1995. The European Union developed crite-
ria for recognition towards the end of 1991 in reaction to the demise of
the two federations. Thus, 1994–1995 might provide a better idea of what
current behaviour might be. Third, it should not matter much which year
in the 1990s is chosen, as the patterns of external assistance are quiet
stable in the 1990s, as I showed in a series of figures in chapter six of
my book ~2001a!.
The biggest difference in independent variables between BDP and
my current analysis is the inclusion of variables that measure not just
affinity with the secessionist group but the ethnic ties in play to all sides.
Each dyad is coded for three different identities—race, religion, and
language9—with the focus on whether the most politically relevant con-
stituencies in the potential supporter are of the same or similar identity
as the majority of the secessionist group, as the politically dominant group
in the host state or both. I describe in the data appendix how each com-
ponent was coded, but the key idea here is that each observation is coded
as follows. A dyad is coded as 1 for racial ties, for instance, if the host
government has the same racial identity as the external actor only, as 1 if
external actor’s key constituents has the same race as secessionist move-
ment only, and as 0 if both sides of the conflict have the same race and it
is the same as potential intervener or if the external actor’s constituents
have no racial ties with either combatant. I then combine the three indi-
vidual identity variables into one measure of total ethnic ties by adding
them together, as presented in Table 2.
We should, therefore, expect more support for the ethnic group if
the ties variable is positive and less if it is negative. Before presenting
the analyses based on my dataset, Table 3 presents a replication of the
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BDP analyses with one change—the substitution of my ethnic ties vari-
able for their ethnic affinity.
The simple substitution of the ethnic ties indicator for BDP’s affin-
ity produces similar results for all of the variables, except ethnic ties is
now significant and in the predicted direction. While this demonstrates
that proper operationalization of the ethnic ties argument produces the
expected results, this replication is not sufficient. First, the dependent
variable of levels is problematic as mentioned above. Second, their indi-
cator of secessionism is unduly restrictive. Third, the ethnic ties vari-
able was coded for a subsequent period. While it is likely that little
changed in the overall analysis, the best test is to consider the 1994–
1995 period for which it was designed. In Table 4, we present the find-
ings of three pairs of analyses, focusing on two sets of dependent
variables measuring whether a government gave support to a group and
how intense that assistance was and using three different universes of
observations—all secessionist groups in MAR, all the groups fitting the
BDP criteria, and then all politically relevant dyads involving any MAR
group.10
The analyses here contradict those of Bélanger, Duchesne and
Paquin, as regime type consistently falls far short of significance whereas
ethnic ties consistently plays a role in the international relations of seces-
sionist conflicts—and of all ethnic conflicts as well. These results are
robust, regardless of specification.11 Using alternative measures of eth-
nic ties, with narrower definitions of what counts as a shared identity,12
TABLE 2
Coding Ethnic Ties
Coding Potential Supporter’s Ties to the Ethnic Group and Host State
3 Linguistic, racial and religious ties to host state only.
2 Three kinds of ties to host and one to ethnic group; two kinds of ties to host
state, and none to ethnic group.*
1 Two kinds of ties to host state, one kind to ethnic group; or one kind of tie to
host state and none to ethnic group.*
0 No ties to ethnic group or host state;* or one kind of tie to host state and one
kind of tie to group ~or two ties to both group and host, or three ties to both!.
1 Two kinds of ties to group state, one kind to host state; or one kind of tie to
group and none to host state.*
2 Three kinds of ties to group and one to host; or two kinds of ties to ethnic group,
none to host.*
3 Linguistic, racial, and religious ties to ethnic group only.
*A dyad is coded as 0 for a particular set of ties, for instance, when no racial ties exist to either
side or racial ties exist to both sides.
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the results are very similar. Dropping variables does not change the pat-
tern of results, and if we use alternative statistical techniques, such as
rare events logit ~King and Zeng, 2001a, 2001b!, the findings remain
largely the same, except relative power becomes somewhat more
significant.
Before moving to explain the findings, I used Clarify to determine
the relative weight of each variable in shaping the likelihood of external
support ~King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King,
2001!. Clarify is a set of tools that allows one to simulate outcomes by
manipulating the variables of interest. To determine the impact of each
variable, I focus on the analyses of all secessionist groups and set the
values of all variables at their minimum except for relative power, which
is set at its mean. Each variable, in turn, is given alternative values, its
minimum and its maximum to determine the difference it makes on the
likelihood of particular outcomes.
TABLE 3
BDP’s Results Replicated26
Original Analyses With Ethnic Ties
Level
~Regression!
Incidence
~Logit!
Level
~Regression!
Occurrence
~Logit!
Joint Democracy .37*** 1.39** .32** 1.3**
~.14! ~.65! ~.14! ~.65!
Joint Autocracy .62 .72 .60 .59
~.42! ~.50! ~.44! ~.52!
Vulnerable .002 .11 .003 .14
~.07! ~.15! ~.07!! ~.17!
Affinity .-.17 .36
~.29! ~.54!
Ethnic Ties .28** .32*
~.11! ~.19!
Cooperation0Conflict .07*** .16*** .07*** .16***
~.02! ~.05! ~.003! ~.05!
Contiguous .45*** 1.46*** .48*** 1.28**
~.15! ~.48! ~.15! ~.50!
Alliance .03 .15 .02 .11
~.09! ~.21! ~.19! ~.22!
Regime Durability .004 .01 .004 .01
~.004! ~.02! ~.004! ~.01!
Constant .16 4.11*** .10 3.84***
~.32! ~.91! ~.38! .94
N 385 385 356 356
R2 .07 .16 .09 .17
*p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .001
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Ethnic ties has the largest substantive impact, as a state is 8 per cent
more likely to give assistance to secessionist group if it has racial,
religious, and linguistic ties only to the group and none to the state,
compared to a situation where the state has ethnic ties only to the host
government.13 States are 1 per cent more likely to assist groups in neigh-
bouring states than distant ones. The confidence intervals of the remain-
ing variables include zero, so we cannot be certain that they have any
particular impact, which corresponds with the significance levels found
in the earlier analyses.
TABLE 4
Democracy, Ethnic Ties and External Support, 1994–1995
Secessionist Groups BDP Groups MAR Groups27
Incidence
~Logit!
Intensity
~Ordered Logit!
Incidence
~Logit!
Intensity
~Ordered Logit!
Incidence
~Logit!
Intensity
~Ordered Logit!
Joint Democracy .17 .15 .26 .26 .14 .14
~.40! ~.41! ~.70! ~.72! ~.25! ~.25!
Joint Autocracy .19 .19 .45 .52 .10 .07
~.34! ~.33! ~.58! ~.55! ~.23! ~.23!
Vulnerable .52* .53* .64 .66 .90*** .90***
~.30! ~.30! ~.50! ~.50! ~.22! ~.22!
Ethnic Ties .69*** .67*** .66*** .64*** .69*** .67***
~.13! ~.13! ~.17! ~.16! ~.10! ~.09!
Relative Power .001* .002* .001 .001 .001*** .001***
~.002! ~.001! ~.001! ~.001! ~.0003! ~.0003!
Contiguous 2.30*** 2.28*** 2.18*** 2.17*** 2.00*** 1.97***
~.41! ~.41! ~.77! ~.78! ~.23! ~.22!
Constant0Cut 1 4.64*** 4.64 4.56*** 4.54 4.91*** 4.88
~.47! ~.87! ~.29!
Cut 2 5.48 4.86 5.99
Cut 3 5.69 5.01 6.34
Cut 4 6.37 5.49 6.93
N 956 956 308 308 2692 2692
Pseudo R2 .1562 .1173 .1515 .1116 .1502 .1181
*p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .001
TABLE 5
First Differences
Variable Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval
Ethnic Ties .082 .043 .026 .195
Joint Democracy .0002 .001 .002 .001
Joint Autocracy .0002 .001 .001 .001
Vulnerability .001 .001 .0001 .004
Contiguous .012 .006 .004 .027
Relative Power .034 .053 .0001 .183
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Assessment and Conclusions
These analyses suggest that ethnic ties holds up better in dyadic analyses
than democracy in accounting for which states are likely to give assis-
tance to ethnic groups, secessionist or not. How can we account for the
differing results? Given the robustness of the findings regardless of the
observations included—BDP groups, all secessionist groups, or all MAR
groups in politically relevant dyads14—the results cannot be driven by
which cases are included in the analyses. As mentioned above, I use a dif-
ferent period—1994–1995—because of the data I had in hand. However,
this should not have mattered that much, given how stable the international
relations of ethnic conflict is ~Saideman, 2001b!. The results may differ
because of interactions within my models or BDP’s. The ethnic ties and
democracy findings do not change in my tests, regardless of specifica-
tion. Given their coding of ethnic affinity versus the indicator I created to
test best the logic of ethnic ties, to one side, the other or both, it is my esti-
mation that the difference in coding this variable accounts for much of the
conflicting results. The outstanding puzzle is why democracy falls short
in my analyses, rather than the performance of ethnic ties, which is easily
explained by the use of a better measure of the hypothesis in question.
Why should this matter? First, democracy should not be seen as a pan-
acea or shield against external involvement in one’s own secessionist con-
flicts. For BDP and for this journal’s readers, the case that most obviously
comes to mind is, of course, Québec. While it might be nice if the rest of
the world would leave this secessionist dispute alone if it were to heat up
yet again, taking solace in Canada’s democracy may not be appropriate.
While violence may be a key variable drawing external involvement,15 the
shared democratic identity of potential supporters and of the government
hosting the ethnic group in question does not seem to matter. Thus, we can
expect other countries to attempt to play a role. Second, ethnic ties tells
us which ones are likely to get involved and on which sides. Again, with
the case of Québec in mind, France is the most obvious case of a country
likely to assist the secession, even sans De Gaulle, given its linguistic ties
to one side of the conflict.16 The logic of the ethnic ties argument is that it
would be far too tempting for France’s politicians to offer at least some
support to Québec to prove to their domestic audience that they are sin-
cere nationalists, regardless of Canada’s democratic norms. On the other
hand, Canada would likely receive support from the Anglophone world.
Obviously, more is in play, as the R2’s, and their equivalents, in both
sets of studies are small, and the substantive impact of ethnic ties is around
or below 10 per cent. Other factors, such as the level of violence, must
also be impacting the decisions of governments to get involved in the
secessionist conflicts of other states. But we cannot be so optimistic about
democracy playing much of a role in all of this.
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Data Appendix:
Descriptive Statistics for All Secessionist Groups
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Support 1032 .13 .58 0 4
Joint Democracy 978 .26 .44 0 1
Joint Autocracy 1032 .18 .39 0 1
Vulnerability 1027 .61 .49 0 1
Ethnic Ties 1032 .11 .92 3 3
Relative Power 1010 38.77 116.62 .0002 1692.76
Contiguity 1032 .47 .50 0 1
Support: Derived from MAR code sheets, see Table 2 for the labels used
to code this variable.
Joint Democracy: Same as BDP—potential supporter and host govern-
ment both considered as a 6 or above in Polity2 dataset.
Joint Autocracy: Same as BDP—potential supporter and host govern-
ment both considered as below 6 in Polity2 dataset.
Vulnerable: If the host state is coded in the MAR dataset as having at
least one actively separatist group in the 1990s.
Relative Power: Using a standard recipe in the field, each country is
averaged in terms of the percentage of its capability in five areas ~mili-
tary personnel and spending, production of iron and steel, total popula-
tion! relative to the world. For each observation, the potential supporter’s
percentage is divided by the host states to create a relative capability
ratio. In alternative tests, I use the natural log of this ratio and get very
similar results.17
Contiguity: Similar to BDP. If the potential supporter and the group’s
host country border each other or are separated by less than 150 miles of
water, that is, Cuba and the United States are considered contiguous.
Ethnic Ties: I start with separate measures of ethnic ties. I code each
group and each country as having a dominant race, religion and lan-
guage. For states ~both potential supporters and host states!, I code the
ethnic characteristics shared by a plurality of the most politically impor-
tant group~s! in 1994–95.18 To code race, a difficult concept to opera-
tionalize, I used conventional categories used by anthropologists. Thus, a
group or a state was coded as predominantly White0European0Caucasian;
African0African-American0Black; Semitic0Arab; Slavic; East Asian; Indo-
Pakistani0West Asian; Pacific Island; Indigenous; or Other ~with coun-
tries with no predominant race coded as other!.19 A potential supporting
country is coded as having racial ties with a group if they are coded as
having the same predominant race. Likewise, a country is coded as hav-
ing racial ties with a host state if both the potential supporter and the
host state have been coded the same race. A dyad is coded as 1 if the
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potential supporter has racial ties only to the ethnic group, as 0 if it has
racial ties to both the host state and ethnic group or to neither, and as 1
if it has racial ties to the host state.
To code religion, I adapt MAR’s coding of groups’ “most common
religion or sect,” and apply the adapted coding not only to groups, but to
potential supporters and host states.20 I made two changes to the MAR
coding, setting up a distinct category for entities ~groups or states! where
the plurality of believers are Orthodox,21 and distinguishing largely Hindu
entities from the category of “Other.”22 Thus, the adapted MAR coding
leaves us with eleven categories: Roman Catholic, Protestant, other Chris-
tian Sect, Orthodox, Sunni, Shi’ite, other Islamic Sect, Buddhist, Animist,
Hindu, Other. I developed two measures: religious ties, narrowly defined;
and religious ties, broadly defined. In the former, religious ties are code
as 1 if the ethnic group and the potential supporter largely shared the
same religion—if the ethnic group was largely Sunni and the potential
supporter was mostly Sunni.23 The dyad is coded as zero if the group is
mostly Sunni and the potential supporter is mostly Shi’ite. Entities that
fit into the “Other” categories are treated as having no religious ties. For
broadly defined religious ties, I collapsed the Protestant, Catholic, other
Christian categories into one category, and the Sunni, Shi’ite, and other
Islamic into a second category. This helps us to address arguments about
Christians versus Muslims, and so on. I use the broader measure in this
article.
For linguistic ties, I use the language family index from Ethno-
logue ~Grimes and Grimes, 2000! that codes groups by common super-
sets. The basic notion is that languages belong to families, and that the
more branches down a family tree two languages share, the more they
have in common. First, we code how similar the languages of the ethnic
group and the potential supporter are, and then we code how similar the
languages of host and potential supporter are.24 This initial indicator var-
ies from one to twenty. A coding of one indicates a group or host state
that is in a completely different language family than that of the poten-
tial supporter ~e.g., Japanese and English, for example!. Twenty reflects
a situation where the two entities share identical languages. Given the
particular distributions of these raw indicators, I collapsed the variables
so that they ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 representing two entities with
languages from completely different language families and 5 represent-
ing two entities with nearly identical or completely identical languag-
es.25 Subtracting linguistic ties between a potential supporter and a host
state from linguistic ties between a potential supporter and the ethnic
group produces a variable ranging from 3 ~linguistic ties to host! to 3
~linguistic ties to ethnic group!. To make this variable comparable to
others, this variable is collapsed to create an indicator ranging from 1
to 1.
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Notes
1 For reviews, see Carment, James and Taydas forthcoming and Saideman and Jenne
forthcoming.
2 Carment, James and Taydas ~2006! find that ethnic ties matter as well. The volumi-
nous literature on diasporas ~King and Melvin, 1999; Shain, 1999; Shain and Barth,
2003! also provides evidence of the relevance of ethnic ties.
3 For more on MAR, see http:00www.minoritiesatrisk.com0. MAR has faced some crit-
icism for selection bias—that rather than gathering data on all ethnic groups around
the world, its observations are those more likely to engage in violence. This is not as
problematic for understanding why some groups receive international assistance as it
is for understanding why some groups mobilize. Because MAR is the only dataset
that codes politically relevant groups around the world, it is the best source of data
for the question at hand.
4 Some of the cases omitted by BDP but included here are groups that most immedi-
ately come to mind when we think of secession and its international relations: Cath-
olics in Northern Ireland, Basques of Spain, Corsicans of France, South Ossetians of
Georgia, Somalis of Ethiopia, Moros of the Philippines, Malays of Thailand, and
Tamils of Sri Lanka.
5 When conflict0co-operation is included, using my dataset and the BDP definition of
groups, it is significant: states tend not to give assistance to groups in countries with
which they have co-operative relationships. Including this measure does not signifi-
cantly alter the rest of the results.
6 The addition or omission of relative power does not change the results much at all,
although the variable is significant in most specifications.
7 To be clear, I use their coding of autocratic, which is anything falling short of democ-
racy, whereas the literature on democratic peace often distinguishes autocracies from
anocracies, regimes that are in between.
8 See footnote 4 as well as the text preceding it.
9 The justification for this is definitions of ethnicity usually focus on the perception
of real or perceived ties based on some sort of trait, usually focusing on race,
religion, language, kinship or custom ~Horowitz, 1985!. Coding any of these is
hard, but the latter two are most difficult. In previously presented work ~Saideman,
2001b, 2003!, I present results with distinct indicators for race, religion, and lan-
guage, but present only a composite of total ties here since the goal here is to show
that ethnic ties matter, rather than the salience or relevance of particular forms of
identity.
10 I reverse BDP’s order of presentation with incidence first and then intensity.
11 Again, adding the variable for conflict0co-operation does not change the results, except
for increasing the pseudo-R2.
12 For instance, in the broader sense, Sunnis and Shi’ites are considered as sharing reli-
gious ties, but in the narrower measures, they are considered to be distinct religious
groups, and similar coding strategies are used for Protestant and Catholic as well.
See the data descriptions in the appendix.
13 The impact of ethnic ties on the international relations of all MAR groups exceeds
10 per cent.
14 In additional tests of all dyads, politically relevant or not, with more than 33,000
observations, joint democracy and joint autocracy are still insignificant, while the
other variables are all quite significant ~p ,.001!.
15 In both earlier work ~Saideman, 2001a, 2002! and the dyadic work ~Saideman, 2001b,
2003!, states are more likely to give assistance to groups engaged in violence against
their host governments. For an analysis of the interactions between violence and sup-
port, see Akbaba, James and Taydas ~forthcoming!.
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16 Indeed, in my coding scheme, France would be coded as “2” if we use a narrow
definition of religious ties, as Quebec and France are both predominantly Catholic,
in addition to their shared language, although in terms of the politics of the likely
decision processes, obviously language would be most relevant.
17 I am very grateful to Doug Van Belle for suggestions on to how construct this indi-
cator. For a similar effort to code relative power, see Bremer ~1992: 322!. Because of
missing data, particularly for energy use, the indicator here is not identical to Bremer’s.
18 I determined which groups were politically important by focusing on the political
base of the regime. In democracies, this largely refers to the general population, but
if parties represent competing ethnic groups, then the ethnic background of the lead-
ing party ~or parties, if a coalition government! were considered. In authoritarian
regimes, the focus is on the ethnic composition of the leader and of the means of
coercion ~the armed forces, presidential guard, secret police, etc.!.
19 I based the categorization on the existing literature on race, both biological and anthro-
pological. See Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza, 1995; Garn, 1962; Lewontin, 1982;
and Osborne, 1971. I included Slavic as a separate racial group, even though anthro-
pologists tend to code Slavs as Caucasians, as study of Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union suggests Slav refers to a racial, not just linguistic or religious,
identity.
20 For an extension of MAR coding on religion, and using it to see if religious identi-
ties draw intervention, see Fox, 2001.
21 MAR’s original coding has Orthodox groups as “other Christian.”
22 There are more predominantly Hindu ethnic groups in the data set than Buddhist,
more Hindu host states than other Christian, other Islamic or Animist, and about as
many Hindu potential supporters as Shi’ite ~two!.
23 This discussion, for the sake of simplicity, does not consider ties to the host state.
The indicators here, like the racial ones, vary from 1 to 1.
24 If more than one language was spoken, we used the language spoken by the largest
percentage of members of the ethnic group or of the politically relevant constituents
of the state.
25 Because some languages have more branches than others, it is hard to say whether
having five branches in common means that the languages are much more similar
than having eight. Collapsing the variable helps to focus on the crucial similarities,
and thus perceived ties, than if we do not.
26 All analyses use robust standard errors to maintain consistency with BDP.
27 The results remain the same if we use all dyads, not just those that are politically
relevant, except joint democracy has a negative but still insignificant coefficient.
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